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 Mine Ergun
 Electoral Political-Business Cycles in
 Emerging Markets
 Evidence from Turkey
 Our research has sought to determine whether Turkish governments
 applied opportunistic fiscal or monetary policies prior to elections in
 order to increase their chances of reelection during the 1987?99 period.
 We further investigated, by using key indicators of economic perfor
 mance, the post-election effects of the way fiscal and monetary instru
 ments were used just prior to elections. Our research differed from
 previous studies on three counts. First, although there exists extensive
 empirical literature testing the Political-Business Cycle (PBC) hypoth
 esis for major developed countries, there is a serious lack of similar
 studies for developing countries and emerging markets with developing
 markets and institutions. This paper aims to fill this gap in the literature.
 In fact, ours was one of the first empirical studies to discuss Electoral
 Political-Business Cycles in Turkey, a developing country and an emerg
 ing market.1 Secondly, we used an extensive data set, including all im
 portant economic policy instrument and indicators, which are particularly
 extensive for budget items. Finally, our study was the first to use monthly
 data to test the PBC hypothesis. The empirical results suggest that, like
 some of the developed countries, Turkey has electoral political-busi
 ness cycles.
 There are two main schools of thought concerning the common no
 tion of politic intervention in economic policy. The first line of thought,
 Mine Ergun, a master's degree student in the Department of Economics at Bilkent
 University, Ankara, is a specialist with the State Planning Organization.
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 the Partisan Political-Business Cycle initiated by Hibbs (1977), deals
 with the characteristic differences in the economic policies of govern
 ments according to their ideological preferences. However, Partisan PBCs
 will not be considered in this paper because Sayan and Berument (1997)
 tested such cycles in Turkey for the 1957?94 time period. Their empirical
 results showed no significant evidence of Partisan PBCs. Hence, this
 study is mainly concerned with the validity, within the Turkish context,
 of the other line of thought, namely Electoral Political-Business Cycles.
 Initiated by Nordhaus (1975) and Lindbeck (1976), the Electoral PBC
 hypothesis argues that a strategic incumbent government would like to
 show good economic performance before elections and applies expan
 sionary economic policies in order to influence voters and maximize its
 chance of reelection. Typically, the incumbent government expects to
 influence voters by adopting policies that increase output or decrease
 unemployment using the exploitable Phillips curve trade-off. Further
 more, the opportunistic manipulations done in the pre-electoral period
 may have important effects on post-electoral economic performance.
 For instance, when the rate of inflation begins to rise after the elections
 as a result of expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, the incumbent
 government could try to decrease inflation by applying post-electoral
 contractionary fiscal and monetary policies, leading to a recession in
 the post-election period. As a result, the economy would contract, and
 would be ready for a new pre-election upswing before the next elec
 tions. Hence, Electoral PBC theory suggests that there are systematic
 variations at some certain macroeconomic indicators, coinciding with
 election periods.
 Empirical studies testing Electoral PBC hypothesis have been car
 ried out for major developed counties (see McCallum, 1978; Alesina
 and Sachs 1988;Rogoff 1990; Alesina and Roubini 1992; and Alesina et al.
 1997). The results of these empirical studies have been mixed, however,
 and have provided little or no evidence in support of the Electoral PBC
 hypothesis. Rogoff and Sibert (1988), considering economic policy in
 struments, stated that an incumbent government reduces taxes or in
 creases government spending before elections in order to be viewed as
 more competent than the opposition. As a consequence of signaling an
 electoral cycle, Budgetary Political-Business Cycles emerge in the fis
 cal variables. Although the voters dislike deficits2 (Tabellini and Alesina
 1990), all the traditional and recent versions of the Budgetary PBC hy
 pothesis assert that an increase in the fiscal deficit should be observed
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 before elections, since the incumbent government will cheat by apply
 ing expansionary or loose fiscal policies before elections (Laney and
 Willett 1983; Alesina et al. 1997). However, there is no agreement on
 the source of this fiscal deficit. The reason may be either the reduction
 in taxes or the increase in government expenditures. Both of these can
 be observed simultaneously, as well. Alesina and Roubini (1992) found
 that government spending has a tendency to increase, and tax revenues
 have a tendency to decrease before elections; but, the electoral dum
 mies do not turn out to be statistically significant in their analysis. Be
 sides, using data from the United States (1960-93), Alesina et al. (1997)
 found that the deficit is higher in election years, but that the pre-elec
 toral dummy is again not statistically significant. However, the esti
 mated coefficient of pre-electoral dummy for the deficit is statistically
 significant for OECD countries. Moreover, they found not only an in
 crease in government spending, but also a decrease in tax revenues for
 OECD countries. Unfortunately, the estimated coefficients of govern
 ment spending and tax revenues are not statistically significant. Fur
 thermore, they tested sub-components of government spending such as
 government transfers and social security expenditures, but found no sta
 tistically significant evidence of Electoral PBCs. Rogoff (1990) consid
 ered components of government spending and claimed that pre-electoral
 signaling will increase government spending. But, the budget cycle will
 appear as distortions in the allocation of the public resources; and con
 sequently, this will lead to reductions in public investment spending.
 Moreover, voters can recognize investment spending only with a lag.
 Thus, instead of spending on investment projects, the incumbent gov
 ernment favors to programs whose effects are more quickly visible.
 Laney and Willett (1983) considered the United States and claimed
 that, over the 1960-76 period, the federal deficit was monetized before
 presidential elections. Furthermore, Rogoff and Sibert (1988) pointed
 out the monetarization of the deficit before elections, and asserted that
 voters can understand the effects of monetarization on inflation only
 with a lag. Alesina, et al. (1997) considered monetary policy and found
 statistically significant evidence of monetary expansion, not in the United
 States, but in the OECD countries. While Ito and Park (1988) studied
 Japan and found no evidence of expansionary monetary policy,
 Heckelman and Berument (1998) found significant evidence of loose
 monetary policy before elections in Japan.
 Alesina (1989), Alesina and Sachs (1988), Alesina and Roubini (1992),
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 and Alesina et al. (1993; 1997)?considering policy outcome tests?
 rejected the main implications of increasing growth and decreasing un
 employment in election years. Alesina, et al. (1997) tested Electoral
 PBCs for both the United States and some OECD countries, but found
 no evidence of increasing output growth and decreasing unemployment
 for either case. Moreover, Heckelman and Berument (1998) found no
 evidence of increasing output in Britain or Japan. Alesina et al. (1997)
 also considered inflation, but found no evidence of decreasing inflation
 prior to elections, neither in the United States nor in OECD countries.
 However, they did find evidence of increasing inflation in the post-elec
 tion period in OECD countries.
 Under an election system that has varying election timing, Ito and
 Park (1988) suggested an alternative hypothesis, Opportunistic Election
 Timing (OET). The OET hypothesis suggests that, instead of manipu
 lating the economy, the incumbent government can call an early elec
 tion when economic performance is good. There is no risk of inflation
 after elections; therefore, choosing the appropriate time to call elections
 is easier than manipulating the economy. Their empirical analysis test
 ing the implications of Opportunistic Election Timing suggests that Ja
 pan is more likely to call early elections when the growth is high. While
 Alesina et al. (1993) rejected the implications of the OET hypothesis for
 all the OECD countries except Japan in their data, Heckelman and
 Berument (1998) considered Japan and Britain and found significant
 evidence supporting the OET hypothesis for monetary growth in Japan,
 contrary to Ito and Park.
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The second section
 gives information about the history of elections in Turkey. Third, we
 describe the data; and the methodology is discussed in the fourth sec
 tion. The empirical findings are reported in the fifth section, followed
 by a summary.
 Historical Background and Turkish Studies
 Before the elections on October 6,1983, a military government was in
 office; therefore, it did not need to manipulate the economy to impress
 voters.3 Besides, there was a lack of politic competition among the par
 ties in this election because some ex-party leaders were prohibited from
 taking part in politics. Full political competition in Turkey restarted in
 1987 when the referendum allowing pre-1980 era party leaders to cam
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 paign took place (Onis 1997). Full political competition is necessary to
 test political-business cycles, because its absence may lead the incum
 bent government to decide on economic policies and outcomes without
 any political anxiety. The government may realize that it has no strong
 opposition; therefore, it may not find it worthwhile to put on its best
 performance. Thus, this paper deals with the time period allowing full
 politic competition.
 There were four elections in the time period under study. The first
 one took place on November 29,1987; the second was held on October
 20,1991. The third and the fourth elections were on December 24,1995
 and April 18,1999, respectively. Although the electoral system for each
 election differed in some ways, their characteristics were basically the
 same. First of all, the Turkish election system is flexible; therefore, the
 government has the chance to call for early elections. In fact, with the
 exception of the one in 1987, all the elections were early and were an
 nounced approximately three or four months before the election date.
 The second common characteristic of the elections was the "10 percent
 minimum." A party had to get at least 10 percent of the votes around the
 country to be represented in the parliament. In fact, high party frag
 mentation made it difficult for some parties to exceed this 10-percent
 minimum. As a result, some popular parties that did not temporarily
 merge with other parties were not able to meet this requirement, and
 were not represented in the parliament following the 1991, 1995, and
 1999 elections.
 In the remaining part of this section, a recent study will be discussed.
 Ozatay (1999), considering a quarterly data set from 1985 to 1995, found
 statistically significant evidence of expansionary monetary and fiscal
 policies using net domestic assets and other transfers. Thus, he con
 cluded that politicians manipulated the economy using fiscal and mon
 etary policies prior to elections. However, he did not consider budget
 deficits, tax revenues or personnel and investment spending, which are
 often used in literature studies as channels for the government to signal
 its competency. Furthermore, he did not consider the interest rate as a
 policy instrument. However, Berument and Malatyali (1998) claimed
 that the Turkish Central Bank used the inter-bank rate as an instrument
 to target M2Y. In the post-election period, Ozatay considered inflation,
 but not fiscal and monetary instruments. Thus, this paper completes his
 work. Ozatay also found evidence of increasing inflation in the post
 election period. Finally, he tested the gap between the rates of increase
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 in public and private sector prices, and found supporting evidence that
 the gap significantly increases prior to elections, although it is elimi
 nated just after the elections.
 Ozatay considered national elections and municipal elections jointly
 in his analysis. However, in this study national and municipal elections
 were considered separately. In addition, the empirical evidence suggested
 that while although municipal elections have no significant effects on
 policy instruments and economic indicators, general elections have sta
 tistically significant effects. The reason fof this difference between types
 of elections may be the fact that, in the rjiunicipal elections, it is not the
 amount of the expenditures by the government, but the allocations
 throughout the country that changes. Thus, this study discusses the em
 pirical results of the effects of general elections only.
 Data
 The data set includes monthly data for fiscal and monetary policy indi
 ces and measures of economic performance, such as inflation and out
 put indicators between January 1985 and May 1999. There are three
 reasons for choosing this period. Firstly, fiscal and monetary figures
 and inflation and production indicators are only readily available after
 1985. Secondly, the pre-electoral effects of the 1987 elections are yet to
 be examined. Finally, this period saw full political competition, as dis
 cussed above.
 In the empirical literature studies of political-business cycles, monthly
 data is not generally studied. Furthermore, the data sample in this study
 is small compared to the literature studies (see Laney and Willett 1983;
 Alesina and Sachs 1988; Ito and Park 1988; Alesina and Roubini 1992;
 Alesina et al. 1997; and Heckelman and Berument 1998). However, us
 ing high-frequency data (e.g., monthly) increases the number of obser
 vations and provides a way to examine the policies applied by the
 government more sensitively. Moreover, high political instability ex
 isted in Turkey during the time period under study. In fact, the govern
 ment changed three times between 1995 and 1999 because of conflicts
 between the coalition partners. Thus, monthly data provides a means of
 examining the economic behavior of frequently changing governments.
 The fiscal data consists of the central government's consolidated bud
 get with both revenue and expenditure items. Revenue items include
 total revenues, tax revenues, direct and indirect revenues, while non-tax
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 revenues usually include portfolio, interest, and rent revenues. Other
 revenues usually include budgetary fund revenues and central bank short
 term advances. For an incumbent government, all the above items are
 channels for signaling by applying opportunistic policies before elec
 tions. For instance, the government can decrease the rent of the houses
 provided for its employees or dismiss fines before elections. A more
 populist tactic would be a tax amnesty.
 Expenditure items of the consolidated budget consist mainly of total
 expenditures, non-interest expenditures, personnel, and investment ex
 penditures. Other current expenditures usually include defense expen
 ditures and transfers to state economic enterprises (SEEs). Other transfers
 usually include transfers to social security institutions, municipalities,
 agricultural subsidy institutions, support and price stabilization funds,
 and off-duty losses. The government decides the amount and the alloca
 tion of the government expenditures. Therefore, government expendi
 tures are more likely than revenues to be channels for implementing
 opportunistic policies. In fact, between 1987 and 1998, the average ratio
 of total revenues to the GNP was 18.0 percent, whereas the average
 ratio of expenditures to the GNP was 23.3 percent. Hence, expenditure
 items are not only more feasible than revenues for implementing oppor
 tunistic, but they are also larger in amount compared with revenues.
 Next, "budget deficit" is defined as the difference between govern
 ment expenditures and revenues, and is included in the data for examin
 ing the interaction between revenues and expenditures during election
 periods. The deficit gives more information about the type of fiscal policy
 (tight or expansionary). The budget deficit is taken as positive when
 total government expenditures exceed its total revenues. However, in a
 country like Turkey, where on the average 7.3 percent of the GNP be
 tween 1985 and 1998 was government interest expenditures, primary
 deficit is more appropriate for determining the type of fiscal policy;
 thus, it is included in the data set.4 In the regressions, all the fiscal vari
 ables are taken as their ratios to total revenues, because our study aims
 to test how the behavior of any fiscal variable compares with the behav
 ior of other fiscal variables during election periods. Fiscal data is taken
 from the Turkish Ministry of Finance, General Directorate of Public
 Accounts monthly bulletins, and the Turkish Central Bank's electronic
 data delivery system (CBEDS) for the time period January 1985 to May
 1999.
 Monetary data consists of monetary aggregates and interest rates.
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 Monetary aggregates are quasi-money, which is mainly time deposits
 plus central bank liabilities, reserve money (MO), Ml, M2, and M2Y,
 where M2Y is M2 plus the foreign time deposits. Monetary aggregates
 are taken from the International Monetary Fund's financial series (IFS),
 and cover the time period from January 1985 through October 1998,
 because this data is readily available for that time period. The interest
 rate data set includes five different interest rates: the three-month Turk
 ish lira (TL) time deposit rate, the three-month United States (US) dol
 lar time deposit rate, nominal and real treasury auction rates, and the
 inter-bank rate. These five interest rates have been chosen because, firstly,
 the inter-bank rate is an instrument of the central bank used to manipu
 late the money market, and reflect the short-term market rate. In fact,
 Berument and Malatyali (1998) have shown that Turkish Central Bank
 uses the inter-bank rate as an instrument to target M2Y. Secondly, the
 three-month TL and U.S. time deposit rates reflect the demand for TL
 and foreign currency. Treasury auction rates are not related to monetary
 policy, and they reflect only the borrowing ease of the Treasury; but
 they are discussed in this paper because they are interest rates. The nomi
 nal treasury auction rate is calculated as the weighted average of inter
 est rates of Treasury auctions during that month, and the real Treasury
 auction rate is calculated by deflating the nominal Treasury auction rate
 with the wholesale price index (WPI). Time deposit and foreign cur
 rency deposit rates are taken from the central bank's electronic delivery
 system (CBEDS) for January 1985 through July 1999. Nominal Trea
 sury rates are taken from the Turkish State Planning Organization's (SPO)
 economic indicators covering the time period from July 1987 to May
 1999. The inter-bank rate, taken from IFS, covers the period from Janu
 ary 1985 to October 1998, because the data is readily available for that
 time period. All the monetary aggregates and interest rates, except the
 inter-bank rate, are used as the logarithmic monthly growth in the re
 gressions because they are non-stationary (see Table 7 on p. 27).
 Our study considers the pre-electoral effects of fiscal and monetary
 policies on inflation. Therefore, the consumer price index (CPI) and
 WPI are included in the empirical analysis. In order to examine the re
 actions of the public and private sector to pre-electoral manipulations,
 public sector and private sector WPIs are included in the data. The pub
 lic sector WPI reflects the price level of government goods and ser
 vices, the private sector WPI reflects the price level of private goods
 and services, and the WPI is the weighted average of the two. In the
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 regressions, the logarithmic monthly growth of the indices are used,
 because all of the indices are non-stationary (see Table 7). The three
 WPIs are taken from the CBEDS, whereas the WPI was calculated by
 the Turkish Treasury for the time period January 1985 to July 1999, and
 the CPI is taken from Turkish State Statistics Institute (SSI) for the time
 period January 1987 to May 1999.
 The industrial production index is used as a proxy for output, instead
 of the real GDP, because monthly real GDP is not available for Turkey.
 Hence, the industrial production index is used to examine the effects of
 the manipulations on output during elections. As for the price indices,
 the logarithmic monthly growth is used for the industrial production
 index, which is also non-stationary (see Table 8 on p. 28). The industrial
 production index is taken from the Turkish State Statistics Institute for
 the time period January 1986 to May 1999.
 Methodology
 To test the implication of the PBC theory, the following model (Model
 1) is estimated.
 ?=1,2,... 6 /=I 1=1
 where y is the policy variable and is assumed to follow an
 autoregressive process. It is also assumed that this process is inter
 rupted by elections, as measured by the dummy term dh; et is the error
 term at time t; n is the lag order, and is specified by looking at Akaike
 information criterion; and k is the month the dummy represents.5 The
 coefficient 5^ of the dummy variable dh is tested under the null hy
 pothesis (H0: 8k = 0). This type of specification is often used in the
 literature.6
 An alternative methodology, to see the effects of elections onyt, is
 to estimate the above using the electoral dummies all together and
 considering the null hypothesis that each coefficient of the dummies
 is equal to zero. However, there may exist a multi-colinearity prob
 lem among the electoral dummies and the policy variable y in such a
 model. '
 The estimates of Model 1 via OLS will be biased if the considered
 cyclic policy variables and economic indicators influence election tim
 n
 (1)
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 ing. In the real world, such a situation may occur if the incumbent gov
 ernment calls an early election when economic performance is going
 well, as noted above (Ito and Park 1988). Ito and Park (1988) and Alesina
 et al. (1993) have suggested different procedures to test the endogeneity
 of elections. This paper follows the methodology of Heckelman and
 Berument (1998) and tests the endogeneity of election timing using the
 Hausman Specification test procedure (1978).
 In order to account for the endogeneity of election timing, the instru
 ment variable, (fh9 is included in Model 1 as:
 n
 yt=a+Z?/^-/+5 A+s,<f *+ut (2) /=i
 Then, Hausman's (1978) second test is applied under the null hy
 pothesis (H0 = 8*^) to check if a simultaneity bias problem exists.7 If the
 null is rejected, then election timing will be endogenous for j/, and the
 model will be misspecified, leading to biased results via OLS. In such a
 case, this paper uses the instrument variable (IV) technique to estimate
 the equations. However, if the null hypothesis is not rejected, election
 timing will be exogenous for and the OLS estimation will give unbi
 ased consistent results. With the scope of this paper, endogenous elec
 tion timing is expected for the variables that government cannot control
 directly, or has less power to control. Thus, election timing may be en
 dogenous for government revenues, the items whose levels the govern
 ment does not have the express power to decide.8 But, it should be
 exogenous for government spending (Keil 1988), since the government
 can decide on its own expenditures. Moreover, the Turkish Central Bank
 is not considered as an independent central bank; thus, money supply
 equations should have exogenous election timing. Finally, with respect
 to spending and money supply equations, the equations of economic
 indicators, such as output growth and inflation, are more likely to have
 endogenous election timing. In fact, the results of the Hausman test sup
 port this intuition.
 Finally, pre- and post-electoral effects of elections on policy vari
 ables are examined using two alternative types of electoral dummies db
 and pdt. The dhs are constructed such that they are equal to one in the
 election month and for the k months before the elections, and zero oth
 erwise. The second type of the electoral dummies, dp^ are constructed
 such that they are equal to one in the election month and k months after
 the elections, and zero otherwise.
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 Empirical Evidence and Discussion
 Table 1 presents the evidence of the elections in the pre-election period
 via OLS. Firstly, the empirical evidence on fiscal variables will be dis
 cussed. The empirical evidence suggests that government expenditures
 statistically significantly increase before elections and government ex
 penditures have the highest correlation with the electoral dummy repre
 senting one month before elections. Moreover, there is statistically
 significant increase in the estimated coefficients for non-interest expen
 ditures and personnel expenditures are statistically significant prior to
 elections. Non-interest expenditures and personnel expenditures have
 the highest correlation with the pre-electoral dummy representing three
 months and two months before elections. The estimates of investment
 expenditures, contrary to Rogoff (1990), show statistically significant
 increase prior to elections. Furthermore, the empirical evidence sug
 gests that the estimated coefficient of other transfers significantly in
 creases before elections, and other transfers have the highest correlation
 with the pre-electoral dummy representing three months before elec
 tions. This "other transfers" item is appropriate for implementing popu
 list policies, including social security, and agricultural and price subsidies.
 Thus, the empirical evidence suggests that the Turkish government sig
 nificantly used this expenditure item before elections. This result is also
 consistent with Ozatay (1999). Moreover, the estimated coefficient of
 transfers to the SEEs shows a statistically significant increase before
 elections, while transfers to the SEEs have the highest correlation with
 the pre-electoral dummy representing the three months before elections.
 In fact, the Turkish government used the SEEs as an instrument for the
 reallocation of resources. The empirical evidence suggests that this re
 allocation process accelerates prior to elections. Hence, the empirical
 evidence suggests that more of total revenues are channeled towards
 government expenditures. The overall empirical evidence is parallel with
 the PBC theory, where the government adopts expansionary fiscal poli
 cies to manipulate the economy before elections.
 As mentioned above, a simultaneous endogeneity problem may arise
 for revenue items. Before discussing pre-electoral effects on revenues,
 the Hausman test, based on Model 2, is applied to the revenue items.
 Table 2 presents Hausman test statistics for revenue items. Given our
 choice of instrument variables, Hausman statistics are significant for
 direct and indirect tax revenues, and an equation for tax revenues. The
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 801) (1.596) (1.658)
 013 0.010 0.009
 993) (0.813) (0.785)
 000 0.002 0.002
 048) (0.322) (0.284)
 029 0.022 0.023
 .091) (0.905) (1.015)
 028***0.023** 0.023**
 851) (2.464) (2.574)
 016 -0.012 -0.013
 017)(-0.788) (-0.934)
 .020* -0.018 -O.019*
 673)(-1.651) (-1.828)
 .003 0.002 0.004
 .245) (0.153) (0.427)
 .008 -0.007 -0.009
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 497) (0.772) (0.815)
 086* 0.063 0.073*
 763) (1.365) (1.694)
 103 0.078 0.054
 526) (1.246) (0.919)
 010 0.009 -0.003
 147) (1.121) (-0.369)
 007 -0.019 -0.004
 313)(-0.881) (-0.217)
 015 -0.014 -0.011
 951 M-0.979) (-0.870)
 007 0.006 0.001
 984) (0.888) (0.216)
 009 0.008 0.001
 200) (1.106) (0.079)
 .009 -0.022 0.039
 127)(-0.327) (0.602)
 .007 0.015 -0.017
 {continues)
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 Table 1 (continued)
 deposit rate
 Treasury bill rate
 Real treasury bill rate
 Inter-bank rate
 Monthly growth
 rate of CPI
 Monthly growth
 rate of WPI
 Monthly growth
 rate of private WPI
 Monthly growth
 rate of public WPI



























































































 Indicates 10% significance level.
 Indicates 5% significance level.
 Indicates 1% significance level.
 t-statistics are reported in parentheses for the corresponding coefficient.
 estimates via OLS will be biased; therefore, the estimates via IV will be
 discussed for direct and indirect tax revenues.
 Table 3 presents the empirical evidence of the effects of elections on
 revenue items via IV. The empirical evidence presented in Table 1 and
 Table 3 suggest that the estimated coefficients for tax revenues and di
 rect taxes decrease prior to elections. In fact, the decrease in direct rev
 enues is statistically significant, but the estimated coefficient for indirect
 tax revenues is mixed. The empirical evidence also suggests that there
 is a decrease in the estimated coefficients of non-tax revenues, whereas
 there is an increase in the estimated coefficients of other revenues and
 short-term advances.
 As a consequence of expansionary fiscal policies, the fiscal deficit is
 expected to increase prior to elections. Hence, the empirical evidence
 presented in Table 1 supports the PBC hypothesis that the budget deficit
 increases prior to elections. In fact, the estimated coefficient of the bud
 get deficit increases statistically significantly in the pre-election period.
 Although the Turkish budget usually has a primary surplus, the empiri
 cal evidence suggests that the estimated coefficient of the primary defi
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 Table 2
 Hausman F-test Statistics for Revenues
 _i_4_<L_?_?_
 Tax revenues 3.704 3.579 3.600 3.641 3.728 4.047*
 Direct taxes 5.731* 4.781* 4.210* 3.90** 4.028* 3.957**
 Indirect taxes 5.100* 11.052* 7.305* 4.684* 4.607* 6.907*
 Non-tax revenues 2.972 2.861 3.016 3.173 2.995 3.134
 Other revenues 1.992 2.042 2.039 1.835 1.895 1.942
 *Indicates 1% significance level.
 **Indicates 5% significance level.
 Table 3
 Effects of Elections on Revenues in the Pre-Election Period, via IV
 _?_i_i_4i_<L-_
 Tax revenues -0.003 0.001 -0.038 -0.005 0.000 -O.026
 (-0.026) (0.011) (-0.684) (-0.074) (-0.002) (-0.351)
 Direct taxes -0.036 -0.035 -0.082*** -0.016 -0.031 -0.030
 (-0.930) (-1.029) (-2.758) (-0.612) (-1.231) (-1.245)
 Indirect taxes -0.104* -0.050 0.062* -0.047 -0.028 -0.031
 (-1.895) (-1.153) (1.788) (-1.386) (-0.899) (-1.019)
 Indicates 10% significance level.
 /-statistics are reported in parentheses for the corresponding coefficient.
 cit statistically significantly increases in the pre-election period. Both
 primary and budget deficits have the highest correlation with the elec
 toral dummies representing three months and one month before elec
 tions, respectively. The reason for the increase in the deficit is the
 significant increase in government spending, since the decrease in tax
 revenues is not statistically significant.
 Secondly, the pre-electoral evidence on monetary variables will be
 discussed. The first type of monetary policy instrument considered in
 this paper is monetary aggregates. The results presented in Table 1 indi
 cate that the growth rates of quasi-money; M2 and M2Y show statisti
 cally significant increases prior to elections. They all have the highest
This content downloaded from 139.179.72.98 on Thu, 03 Jan 2019 17:02:03 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 20 RUSSIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN FINANCE AND TRADE
 correlation with the electoral dummy representing the month before elec
 tions. Thus, it can be concluded that the empirical evidence supports the
 hypothesis of expanding monetary policy in the pre-election period. How
 ever, the empirical evidence suggests that the estimated coefficient of Ml
 decreases, whereas the estimated coefficient of reserve money is mixed.
 The second type of monetary policy considered in our study is a set
 of interest rates. The inter-bank rate might be considered as the mon
 etary instrument of the central bank among the interest rates to manipu
 late the economy. The empirical evidence suggests that in the pre-election
 period the estimated coefficient of the inter-bank rate decreases, but the
 correlation between the inter-bank rate and electoral dummies is not
 statistically significant. Alesina et al. (1997) test long-term interest rates
 for OECD countries, and they also find no statistically significant de
 crease in interest rates. In addition, the empirical evidence suggests that
 the estimated coefficients for nominal and real Treasury auction rates
 increase prior to elections, while the electoral dummies do not turn out
 to be significant for them. To sum up, expansionary monetary policies
 applied using monetary aggregates in the pre-election period. Thirdly,
 the pre-electoral evidence on inflation will be discussed. The PBC theory
 suggests that inflation is lower prior to elections, whereas it is higher
 after elections due to the expansionary fiscal and monetary policies ap
 plied in the pre-election period (Nordhaus 1975; Rogoff and Sibert 1988;
 and Alesina et al. 1997). Furthermore, as mentioned in the previous sec
 tion, the inflation equation may have endogenous election timing be
 cause the government cannot control inflation directly, and inflation is
 an important indicator of the economic performance of a country. Table
 4 presents the Hausman test for inflation. The results indicate that one
 of the regressions of the CPI suffers from endogeneity. Thus, the em
 pirical evidence via IV, as presented in Tables 1 and 5, suggest that
 the estimated coefficients for the CPI, the public WPI, and the private
 WPI are mixed. However, the empirical evidence presented in Table 1
 suggests that the estimated coefficient of public sector WPI decreases
 prior to elections. In fact, the correlation between the growth rate of
 public sector WPI and elections is negative; therefore, the incumbent
 government tries to keep the growth rate of public sector goods and
 services below the growth rate of market prices.
 Finally for the pre-election period, the evidence on output will be
 discussed. The empirical evidence presented in Table 4 suggests that the
 equations for the industrial production index suffer from endogeneity.
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 Table 4
 Hausman F-test Statistics for Inflation-Output
 _i_<k_&_<L_?_i
 Monthly growth
 rateofCPI 4.125* 2.146 1.848 1.738 1.753 1.868
 Monthly growth
 rateofWPI 1.647 1.757 1.639 1.682 1.881 2.155
 Monthly growth
 rate of private WPI 2.252 2.279 2.669 2.939 2.960 2.803
 Monthly increase in
 industrial production
 index 10.952* 8.637* 8.638* 8.103* 8.190* 8.034*
 Indicates 1% significance level.
 Table 5
 Effects of Elections on Inflation-Output in the Pre-Election Period, via IV
 _4 4,_c?_
 Monthly growth
 rateofCPI 0.024 0.023 0.023 0.026* 0.026* 0.015
 (1.530) (1.600) (1.575) (1.925) (1.844) (1.151)
 Monthly increase
 in industrial
 production index 0.076 0.058 0.004 -0.004 -0.011 0.001
 (1.102) (0.982) (0.110) (-0.088) (-0.268) (0.022)
 Indicates 10% significance level.
 r-statistics are reported in parentheses for the corresponding coefficient.
 Moreover, the empirical evidence presented in Table 5 suggests that the
 estimated coefficient of the industrial production index is mixed. Thus,
 there is no significant increase in output prior to elections.
 To conclude, in the pre-election period the empirical evidence sug
 gests that the incumbent government applies expansionary fiscal and
 monetary policies and tries to keep the growth rate of public sector goods
 and services low to impress the voters.
 The empirical evidence on the post-electoral effects of elections is
 presented in Table 6. Firstly, the empirical evidence suggests that the
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 estimated coefficient for total government expenditures increases sta
 tistically significantly after elections. Moreover, government expendi
 tures have the highest correlation with the electoral dummy representing
 two months after elections. Similarly, empirical evidence suggests that
 non-interest expenditures of the government shows a statistically sig
 nificant increase after elections and the estimated coefficient for non
 interest expenditures has the highest correlation with the dummy
 representing two months after elections. The empirical evidence also
 suggests that the estimated coefficients of investment expenditures in
 crease statistically significantly after elections. In fact, investment ex
 penditures have the highest correlation with the electoral dummy
 representing the first month after elections. Next, empirical evidence
 suggests that there is an increase in the estimated coefficient of other
 current expenditures in the post-election period; however, other current
 expenditures have no statistically significant correlation with the post
 electoral dummies. Furthermore, the estimates for the "other transfers"
 item show a statistically significant increase after elections. Other trans
 fers have the highest correlation with the dummy representing two months
 after elections. Thus, the government prefers to channel its funds to so
 cial security, and to price and agricultural subsidies after elections to
 realize its promises to voters during the pre-election period. The esti
 mated coefficients of personnel expenditures and transfers to the SEEs
 have mixed results.
 In the post-election period, the empirical evidence suggests that the
 increase in estimated coefficient of tax revenues is statistically signifi
 cant after elections and tax revenues have the highest correlation with
 the electoral dummy representing two months after elections. Similarly,
 the estimated coefficients of indirect and direct taxes significantly in
 crease after elections and both indirect and direct tax revenues have the
 highest correlation with the electoral dummy representing two months
 after elections. Next, non-tax and other revenues show a statistically
 significant decrease and have significant correlations with the electoral
 dummy representing two months after elections. Hence, it can be con
 cluded that the ratio of tax revenues to total revenues increases after
 elections and, although the government continues to increase its spend
 ing, it applies tighter tax policies during the post-election period.
 As presented in Table 6, the empirical evidence suggests that the es
 timated coefficients of primary and budget deficits increase in the post
 election period. In fact, both primary and budget deficits have the highest
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 Table 6
 Effects of Elections in the Post-Election Period, via OLS
 _<fa dp0 dp,_dpA dp, dpR
 Expenditures 0.221* 0.243** 0.093 0.034 0.058 0.063
 (1.925) (2.409) (1.020) (0.417) (0.774) (0.917)
 Non-interest
 expenditures 0.169** 0.173** 0.093 0.032 0.003 -0.005
 2.155 2.466 1.440 0.545 (0.061) (-0.104)
 Personnel
 expenditures -0.018 0.027 0.018 0.006 -0.008 -0.011
 (-0.689) (1.189) (0.912) (0.300) (-O.470) (-0.702)
 Investment
 expenditures 0.063*** 0.036* 0.018 0.012 0.000 -0.003
 (3.075) (1.921) (1.050) (0.748) (-0.025) (-0.220)
 Other current
 expenditures 0.002 0.006 0.008 0.005 0.003 0.003
 (0.204) (0.609) (0.962) (0.617) (0.369) (0.435)
 Other transfers 0.098** 0.095** 0.055 0.031 0.021 0.013
 (2.258) (2.533) (1.613) (1.001) (0.716) (0.499)
 Transfers to SEEs -0.008 0.004 -0.005 -0.012 -0.014 -0.011
 (-0.509) (0.279) (-0.363) (-1.072) (-1.279) (-1.058)
 Tax revenues 0.007 0.061*** 0.041** 0.030* 0.030* 0.027*
 (0.271) (2.869) (2.151) (1.676) (1.726) (1.676)
 Direct taxes 0.005 0.037** 0.016 0.005 0.007 0.003
 (0.256) (2.224) (1.108) (0.405) (0.530) (0.280)
 Indirect taxes 0.017 0.036** 0.029** 0.025** 0.020* 0.021*
 (0.901) (2.305) (2.101) (1.991) (1.691) (1.959)
 Non-tax revenues -0.012 -0.031* -0.010 -0.005 -0.001 0.000
 (-0.591) (-1.864) (-0.654) (-0.334) (-0.057) (0.029)
 Other revenues -0.010 -0.063*** -0.042** -0.032* -0.026 -0.022
 (-0.408) (-2.984) (-2.225) (-1.826) (-1.590) (-1.457)
 CB advances -O.004 0.025 0.007 -0.012 0.001 0.012
 (-0.051) (0.343) (0.102) (-O.201) (0.017) (0.227)
 Primary balance 0.169** 0.173** 0.093 0.032 0.003 0.005
 (2.155) (2.466) (1.440) (0.545) (0.061) (0.104)
 Budget balance 0.221* 0.243** 0.093 0.034 0.058 0.063
 (1.925) (2.409) (1.020) (0.417) (0.774) (0.917)
 Quasi-money 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.007 0.005 0.004
 (0.424) (0.572) (0.974) (0.873) (0.578) (0.506)
 Reserve money -0.041 -0.045 -0.049* -0.011 -0.022 -0.036
 (-1.131) (-1.527) (-1.918) (-0.455) (-1.000) (-1.749)
 M1 -0.006 -0.002 -0.020 -0.003 -0.011 -O.014
 (-0.225) (-0.120) (-1.120) (-0.214) (-0.740) (-1.055)
 M2 0.020* 0.010 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004
 (1.764) (1.046) (0.562) (0.679) (0.564) (0.594)
 (continues)
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 Table 6 (continued)
 M2Y 0.021* 0.008 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002
 (1.827) (0.828) (0.503) (0.431) (0.453) (0.360)
 Time deposit rate 0.047 0.348*** 0.286*** 0.247*** 0.220*** 0.183***
 (0.413) (3.951) (3.561) (3.313) (3.131) (2.727)
 U.S. dollar time
 deposit rate 0.068 0.304*** 0.276*** 0.227*** 0.216*** 0.199***
 (0.677) (3.847) (3.703) (3.145) (3.160) (3.016)
 Treasury bill rate 0.043** 0.016 0.005 0.008 0.006 0.010
 (2.052) (0.844) (0.296) (0.496) (0.382) (0.711)
 Real Treasury
 bill rate 0.048* 0.018 -0.002 0.007 0.002 0.011
 (1.917) (0.794) (-0.096) (0.350) (0.118) (0.648)
 Inter-bank rate -O.041 -0.035 -O.009 -0.016 -0.009 -0.012
 (-0.952) (-0.980) (-0.287) (-0.566) (-0.350) (-0.469)
 Monthly growth
 rate of CPI -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.001
 (-0.200) (-0.204) (-0.052) (0.134) (0.318) (-0.268)
 Monthly growth
 rate of WPI 0.011 0.013 0.018 -0.007 -0.004 -0.005
 (0.693) (0.977) (1.523) (-0.669) (-0.392) (-0.517)
 Monthly growth
 rate of private WPI 0.008 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.005 0.003
 (1.113) (0.939) (1.286) (1.553) (1.129) (0.693)
 Monthly growth
 rate of public WPI 0.021 0.020 0.032*** 0.031** 0.026* 0.019
 (1.353) (1.523) (2.769) (2.881) (2.515) (1.894)
 Monthly increase in
 industrial production index 0.029 0.019 0.027* 0.018 0.018
 0.008
 (1.472) (1.132) (1.838) (1.281) (1.397) (0.658)
 Indicates 10% significance level.
 Indicates 5% significance level.
 Indicates 1% significance level.
 /-statistics are reported in parentheses for the corresponding coefficient.
 correlation with the dummy representing two months after elections.
 Thus, although the ratio of tax revenues to total revenues shows a statis
 tically significant increase in the post-election period, the ratio of gov
 ernment expenditures continues to increase so that the budget deficit
 increases significantly in the post-electoral period.
 Secondly, in the post-election period, the political-business cycles
 suggests a tight monetary policy to eliminate the inflationary effects of
 expansionary economic policies applied in the pre-election period. The
 empirical evidence presented in Table 6 suggests that the estimated co
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 efficient for reserve money shows a statistically significant decrease
 after elections, while reserve money has the highest correlation with the
 dummy representing three months after elections. While the estimated
 coefficient of Ml increases insignificantly, the estimated coefficient of
 M2 and M2Y shows a statistically significant increase after elections.
 Thus, the empirical evidence does not support the hypothesis that tight a
 monetary policy is applied in the post-election period.
 In the post-election period, the inter-bank rate behaves similarly to
 its pre-election behavior. The empirical evidence suggests that the esti
 mated coefficient of the inter-bank rate decreases after elections, but the
 correlation between the inter-bank rate and election dummies is not sta
 tistically significant. As for the interest rates in the post-election period,
 an increase in the interest rates is expected due to the tight monetary
 policy, which may have been adopted. In fact, the empirical evidence
 suggests that the estimated coefficients of the three-month TL and U.S.
 dollar time deposit rate increase significantly after elections. Moreover,
 TL and U.S. dollar time deposit rates both have the highest correlation
 with the electoral dummies representing two months after the election.
 Although, the empirical evidence does not support contractionary poli
 cies in monetary aggregates in the post-election period, it supports the
 increasing interest rates. Thus, the incumbent government has manipu
 lated the economy by using monetary supply aggregates in the pre-elec
 tion period and by using interest rates in the post-election period.
 Furthermore, the empirical evidence suggests that the estimated coeffi
 cient of nominal treasury rates shows a statistically significant increase
 after elections, while the nominal treasury rate has the highest correla
 tion with the dummy representing the first month after elections. The
 increase in the nominal treasury rate can be attributed to the increase in
 the budget deficit.
 Thirdly, the empirical evidence suggests that the estimated coeffi
 cients of the CPI and the WPI are mixed for the post-election period,
 while the estimated coefficient of the monthly growth of the public sec
 tor WPI shows a statistically significant increase. In fact, it has the high
 est correlations with the electoral dummy representing four months after
 elections. The estimated coefficient of the private WPI increases in the
 post-election period, but the correlation between the private WPI and
 post-electoral dummies does not turn out to be significant.
 In fact, as shown in Figure 1, the increase the in monthly growth of
 the public sector WPI after elections can be detected easily. The vertical
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 Figure 1
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 lines represent the election times. Thus, the empirical evidence supports
 the hypothesis that inflation increases in the post-election period in the
 public sector.
 As mentioned before, although the public sector WPI decreases prior
 to elections, it increases statistically significantly after elections. How
 ever, the same behavior cannot be observed in the private sector WPI.
 Therefore, to examine the different behaviors of the two price indices,
 following Ozatay's view, another variable, wedge, is defined as the dif
 ference between the monthly logarithmic growths of public and private
 sector WPIs. Model 3 is estimated to examine the relationship between
 public and private WPIs before and after elections.
 where dt is the electoral dummy and s. represents the monthly seasonal
 dummies.
 Table 7 presents the empirical evidence by estimating Model 3 with
 both pre- and post-electoral dummies.9 The empirical evidence suggests
 that the estimated coefficient for the wedge turns out to be negative in
 the pre-election period. Thus, the growth rate of the price level of public
 sector goods and services is lower than for private sector goods and
 services. In fact, Turkey has been suffering from high rates of inflation
 for 25 years, and the incumbent government has not wanted to increase
 social tensions before elections. Therefore, it has tried to keep the price
 n
 (3)
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 Table 7
 Effects of Elections on the Wedge Between Public and Private Sector
 Inflation in the Pre-Election and Post-Election Periods
 _4_4>_<k_?_4_oL_
 Wedge between
 monthly growth rate
 of public and
 private WPI -0.006 -0.003 -0.007 -0.008 -0.004 -0.009
 (-0.501) (-0.247) (-0.743) (-1.027) (-0.493) (-1.252)
 _dp, dp, dp, dpA dpK dpR
 Wedge between
 monthly growth rate
 of public and
 private WPI 0.011 0.013 0.023** 0.021** 0.017** 0.014*
 (0.903) (1.240) (2.510) (2.505) (2.218) (1.855)
 Indicates 10% significance level.
 Indicates 5% significance level.
 Indicates 1% significance level.
 r-statistics are reported in parentheses for the corresponding coefficient.
 level of public goods and services below the general price level before
 elections. However, the empirical evidence suggests that the estimated
 coefficient of wedge becomes statistically significantly positive in post
 election periods. Hence, the incumbent government lets public sector
 prices adjust to the general price level, causing the estimated coefficient
 of the gap between the public and private sector WPIs to become sig
 nificantly positive after elections.
 Finally, the empirical evidence presented in Table 6 suggests that the
 increase in the estimated coefficient of industrial production index is
 statistically significant in the post-election period. In fact, industrial pro
 duction has the highest correlation with the post-electoral dummy rep
 resenting three months after elections.
 To sum up, in the post-electoral period, the government applies not
 only expansionary expenditure policies, but also tight revenue policies.
 Moreover, the growth rate of public sector goods and services shows a
 statistically significant increase. In fact, this increase is greater than the
 increase in the private sector. Therefore, the wedge of the growth rates
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 Table 8
 ADF Unit Root Tests
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 Indicates null hypothesis of ADF test is rejected at 1% significance level.
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 of public and private sector prices increases statistically significantly in
 the post-election periods.
 Summary and Conclusions
 This study aims to test the electoral PBC hypothesis in Turkey using
 monthly data from January 1985 to May 1999, including both fiscal and
 monetary indices and measures of economic performance. Pre- and post
 electoral dummies are constructed to examine the effects of the elec
 tions on the policy instruments and economic outcomes, while an
 autoregressive model is estimated using electoral dummies.
 Our research differs from the studies in the existing literature with
 respect to the following points. First, the data set is extensive, including
 all the important economic policy instruments and indicators, especially
 for budget items. Secondly, the extensive data set is monthly. Finally,
 the literature studies take into consideration only developed countries
 Thus, by considering a developing country to test the PBC hypothesis,
 this paper fills a gap in the literature. In fact, we found significant evi
 dence to support the view that Turkey, a developing country, has elec
 toral political-business cycles.
 Empirical evidence provides statistically significant evidence of elec
 toral political-business cycles in Turkey for various policy instruments
 and economic performance indicators. The first contribution of this pa
 per to the literature is that the statistically significant empirical evidence
 supports the hypothesis of political-business cycles that expansionary
 fiscal policies are applied prior to elections. In fact, there is a statisti
 cally significant increase in government expenditures before elections.
 In addition to the significant increase in expenditures, tax revenues de
 crease significantly prior to election. As a consequence of both rising
 expenditures and declining tax revenues, primary and budget deficits
 increase statistically significantly before elections. Therefore, it can be
 concluded that the incumbent government has applied expansionary fis
 cal policies in Turkey in the pre-election period. Moreover, this result is
 consistent with other empirical studies in the literature (see Rogoff et al.
 1997). The interesting point is that the expansionary fiscal policies con
 tinue after elections. The government expenditures increase so signifi
 cantly that even though tax revenues increase significantly, budget deficits
 continue to increase after elections. In fact, the increasing budget deficit
 in the post-electoral period can be considered as an inheritance from
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 previous governments, which manipulated the economy with expansion
 ary fiscal policies, because two of the elections resulted in a change in
 the ruling party. It is necessary to mention that the empirical evidence
 supporting electoral political-business cycles in fiscal variables is much
 stronger than the empirical evidence in any study done for various other
 countries.10 The reason may be the institutional differences in proce
 dures, such as the preparation, approval, and implementation of the
 budget among the countries that are discussed (see Alesina and Perotti
 1995).
 The second contribution of this paper to the literature on political
 business cycles is that the empirical evidence provides statistically sig
 nificant evidence supporting the hypothesis of political-business cycles
 that expansionary monetary policies are adopted in the pre-election pe
 riod. In fact, money supplies such as M2 and M2Y have cyclic behav
 iors before elections and increase significantly, whereas, after elections,
 interest rates have significant cyclic behaviors in contrast to the pre
 election period. In fact, TL and U.S. currency time deposit rates increase
 statistically significantly after elections. Moreover, due to the signifi
 cant increase in budget deficits in pre- and post-election periods, trea
 sury rates increase, as does the Treasury's ease of borrowing.
 The third contribution of this paper to the PBC literature is that the
 empirical evidence supports the PBC hypothesis of increasing inflation
 in the post-election period. In fact, the increase in the public sector WPI
 is statistically significant after elections. There are three possible rea
 sons for the significant increase in inflation after elections. The first one
 is that the government manipulates the economy with expansionary
 monetary policies, choosing its monetary policies so that the burden of
 the expansionary monetary policy will be realized with higher inflation
 after elections. The second reason is that inflation increases with a delay
 due to expansionary fiscal stimulation done before elections, and that
 the government adjusts fiscal standards with higher taxes after elec
 tions. The last reason is that the government tries to keep the price level
 of government goods and services low before elections so as not to in
 crease social tensions. However, after elections, due to the first two rea
 sons discussed above, the incumbent government can no longer keep
 public sector prices low. Therefore, it lets the public sector prices adjust
 to the general price level.
 The empirical results presented in this paper are generally consistent
 with PBC theory. The empirical evidence suggests that the incumbent
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 government manipulated the Turkish economy in pre-election periods
 to increase its chances of reelection between 1985 and 1999.
 Notes
 1. Ozatay (1999) considered electoral political-business cycles in Turkey, but
 his data set includes a limited number of fiscal and monetary policy indices.
 2. The cost of deficits can be very high, and the voters do not want to pay the
 bill of the deficit.
 3. The democratic parliamentary system has been working efficiently since the
 last military interruption in 1980.
 4. Primary deficit is defined as the difference between non-interest expendi
 tures and total revenues.
 5. In fact, in the empirical study, the effects of elections were tested for 12
 months; the corresponding results will be provided by the authors upon request
 6. See McCallum (1978), Alesina and Sachs (1988), Ito and Park (1988), Alesina,
 it al. (1993), and Heckelman and Berument (1998).
 7. In fact, Hausman's (1978) Second Test is an F-test with the restriction
 d*k = 0.
 8. For instance, taxes such as VAT depend on the consumption behavior of the
 agents, which the government cannot directly control.
 9. In the empirical study, pre- and post-electoral effects on the wedge for 12 months
 were also considered; the results will be provided by the authors upon request
 10. In literature, although expansionary fiscal policies are suggested prior to elec
 tions, the empirical evidence, especially for sub-components of expenditure and
 revenues, is rarely statistically insignificant.
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